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Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus 
Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic 
Partnership Laws and Ordinances∗ 
Terry S. Kogan∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Efforts to enact domestic partnership schemes like that embodied 
in chapter 6 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
are faced with a fundamental question as to the proper scope of cov-
erage. Motivated in part by a desire to provide marital-like benefits 
to same-sex couples who lack full marriage rights, drafters of these 
schemes must decide whether to include opposite-sex couples within 
the schemes’ ambit. The purpose of this article is to explore the 
competing ways in which various approaches to domestic partnership 
laws treat opposite-sex, unmarried couples in comparison to same-
sex couples. An important social and ethical question underlies this 
inquiry: Are there relevant differences that would justify treating op-
posite-sex, unmarried couples differently from same-sex couples? 
I identify three different approaches to this issue. The first ap-
proach, which I term the Leveling Position, treats same-sex couples 
more favorably than it treats opposite-sex, unmarried couples by of-
fering domestic partnership benefits only to the former.1 
The second approach, which I term the Equality Position, treats 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex, unmarried couples identically in 
granting domestic partnership benefits. This is the position taken by 
the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, under consid-
eration at this conference.2 
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, S.J. Quinney College of 
Law, University of Utah. 
 1. See generally James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic 
Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 649 (1998). 
 2. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) §§ 6.01–6.06 [hereinafter 
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Finally, the third approach, which I term the Moralistic Position, 
condemns domestic partnership schemes in general and, in doing so, 
treats opposite-sex, unmarried couples more favorably than same-sex 
couples.3 Specifically, the Moralistic Position insists that the only re-
lationship between opposite-sex couples worthy of state recognition 
is the marital relationship. At the same time, because it condemns 
homosexuality, the Moralistic Position opposes any state recognition 
of same-sex relationships whatsoever. Not only does it oppose ex-
tending marriage rights to same-sex couples; the Moralistic Position 
also opposes the state’s recognizing same-sex relationships through 
any other statutory or regulatory program, including domestic part-
nership schemes. Accordingly, while opposite-sex couples are en-
couraged to marry, same-sex couples are effectively encouraged to 
disappear from the state’s visage. In discussing the Moralistic Posi-
tion, I will of necessity have to step away from domestic partnership 
schemes and discuss the issue of marriage rights for same-sex couples 
more directly. 
I will examine these approaches from several perspectives. First, I 
will ask whether the justification offered by each makes sense in light 
of a fundamental goal of family law: Does the approach tend to fos-
ter stable, long-term, mutually supportive, committed relationships 
between two people that are conducive to rearing children in a fi-
nancially sound environment?4 Second, I will ask how each approach 
fares in terms of principles of fairness and equality, principles critical 
to our constitutional democracy. Finally, I will examine each position 
 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. See also Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law: 
Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 991 
(2000). 
 3. I associate this position most closely with the writings of Lynn Wardle of Brigham 
Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critique of the 
ALI’s Effort to Redefine “Family” by Increasing the Relationships Given Marital and Parental 
Status, 2001 BYU L. REV. (2001); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 735 (1998) [hereinafter Wardle, Redefining Marriage]. 
 4. Carl Schneider has described this function of family law more generally as the chan-
neling function. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO 
FAMILY LAW: PROCESS, PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 200 (2d ed. 2000) (“[F]amily law 
may . . . be said to try to discourage harmful behavior within families, to encourage happiness 
in intimate relationships, and to promote social stability by establishing, promoting and chan-
nelling people into social institutions that seem to conduce to those goals and by channelling 
people away from social institutions that seem to disserve them.”); see also Carl E. Schneider, 
The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992). 
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from the viewpoint of a gay rights advocate and ask whether the ap-
proach is a wise strategic position in furthering the civil rights of gay 
and lesbian people in our society. 
This leads me to a final introductory point. I want to make my 
underlying position clear from the outset. Though this paper focuses 
on domestic partnership issues, because of the centrality of chapter 6 
of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution to this con-
ference, it is my strong belief that nothing less than full marriage 
rights should be extended to same-sex couples. Accordingly, all do-
mestic partnership schemes, including that embodied in chapter 6 of 
the ALI Principles, must be seen as second-best solutions, as but a 
way station on the road to full marriage rights for gay and lesbian 
people. This is not to condemn domestic partnership schemes out-
right. In our second-best world, loving gay couples may have to 
make do, at least for the present, with the lesser rights given them by 
such schemes. But we should not lose sight of the ultimate fair 
goal—full, equal marriage rights. 
With this background, let us first consider domestic partnership 
schemes in general and then examine each of the three positions 
identified above. 
II. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP SCHEMES 
Modern domestic partnership schemes have been adopted by 
public entities and by private businesses. They have been motivated 
by two developments. First, the extent of cohabitation between un-
married adults has been on a steady rise for decades.5 Second, gay 
and lesbian couples have in the recent past been more willing to be 
open about their relationships as our society has gained a greater tol-
erance for the civil rights of minority groups in general. The greater 
presence of nontraditional couples in our society has led public and 
private entities to consider extending a range of benefits, normally 
reserved to married couples, to unmarried couples.6 
 
 5. “Unmarried couples comprise nearly 3 million of the United State’s [sic] 93 million 
households. This represents an increase greater than 400% over the past thirty years.” Jonathan 
Andrew Hein, Caring for the Evolving American Family: Cohabiting Partners and Employer 
Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REV. 19, 20 n.12 (2000). The number of unmarried cou-
ples living together has increased from 1.6 million in 1980 to 4.1 million in 1997. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1998, Table 66 (118th ed. 
1998). 
 6. The recent passage of a range of domestic partnership schemes in the United States 
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All domestic partnership schemes provide fewer rights than those 
currently provided by marriage. To begin with, state and municipally 
sponsored domestic partnership programs cannot grant the full range 
of federal rights now granted to married couples,7 and federal pas-
sage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)8 strongly suggests that 
Congress is unlikely to extend such federal rights to same-sex cou-
ples anytime soon, irrespective of what may happen at the state level. 
The most extensive rights granted by a domestic partnership scheme 
are those embodied in Vermont’s Civil Union Act,9 which extends to 
same-sex couples who enter into formal civil unions and remain in 
Vermont “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities un-
der law, . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”10 Hawaii’s Re-
ciprocal Beneficiaries Act11 provides more limited benefits to same-
sex couples (unmarried, opposite-sex couples are ineligible), includ-
ing funeral leave for state employees, hospital visitation rights, health 
insurance coverage for partners of state employees, and the ability to 
claim an elective share of a partner’s estate. At the other end of the 
spectrum are domestic partnership schemes that allow only for regis-
tration of a domestic partnership with a municipal agency—largely a 
symbolic act.12 
 
parallels similar moves in other countries extending a range of rights to same-sex couples. As 
noted by Barbara Cox: 
Today, Denmark (1989), Norway (1993), Greenland (1994), Sweden (1995), Ice-
land (1996), the Netherlands (1998), and France (1999) recognize same-sex unions 
through “registered partnerships.” Additionally, Australia treats the long-term part-
ners of gay men and lesbians the same as spouses for immigration purposes, and 
Canada, Israel, Namibia, South Africa, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Hungary 
recognize such relationships for a variety of purposes. 
Barbara J. Cox, “The Little Project”: From Alternative Families to Domestic Partnerships to 
Same-Sex Marriage, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 81 (2000) (citations omitted). 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2000). The United States General Accounting Office 
has concluded that 1,049 federal laws providing for benefits depend on marital status—benefits 
including favorable tax treatment, Social Security benefits, child support enforcement, Medi-
care and Medicaid, housing benefits, veteran’s benefits, and federal employment benefits. 
United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, Jan. 31, 1997, at 2 (Fed. Doc. Clearing 
House 1996), cited in Cox, supra note 6, at 77 n.68. 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2000). 
 9. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (Supp. 2000). 
 10. Id. § 1202(a). 
 11. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2000). 
 12. Domestic partnership registry schemes have been adopted in, among other munici-
palities, New York, Atlanta, San Francisco, Denver, Milwaukee, and Seattle. One commentator 
noted: 
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This paper is concerned with domestic partnership schemes cre-
ated by public entities (irrespective of the extent of benefits offered). 
This concern is motivated by the fact that a public entity’s decision 
to adopt such benefits carries with it significant symbolic meaning. 
In effect, the adoption of a domestic partnership scheme places the 
state’s stamp of approval on the form of relationship covered by the 
benefits program.13 In particular, public recognition of same-sex rela-
tionships not only sends a message to the broader society, but also 
provides a symbol for the couple themselves that their relationship is 
worthy enough to deserve state recognition and benefits. Moreover, 
the extension of domestic partnership benefits by a public entity to 
nontraditional couples embodies a commitment by that society to 
values of fairness, tolerance, and diversity. Though the decision of a 
private entity to extend domestic partnership benefits can send a 
similar message, most private entities justify their extending such 
benefits as largely profit driven, as one way of attracting the best em-
ployees in a highly competitive market.14 This type of justification 
has little relevance in the public setting. 
 
Most of the domestic partner registries adopted so far are fairly similar. These ordi-
nances provide for a structure or registration, as well as dissolution of the partner-
ships. Although many of the ordinances provide no benefit beyond the ability to de-
clare themselves domestic partners openly and publicly, some do provide access to 
city services (like prison/hospital visitation) and benefits correspondent to those of-
fered to the spouses of city employees.  
Heidi Eischen, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner 
Benefits Legislation, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 530 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., id., at 532 (“On a public level, domestic partner statutes and ordinances 
may send an important message—that the municipality or state that one lives in supports its 
community of same-sex couples.”). Carl Schneider has described the use of family law to con-
vey symbolic messages as its expressive function. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 4, at 
202. See also Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 991 (1989); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdepend-
ence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 BOSTON C. L. REV. 265, 272 (2000) (addressing 
the “expressive function” of family law). 
 14. As noted by Barbara Cox:  
As of October 1, 1999, over 3500 organizations in the United States have domestic 
partner benefits, and additional organizations are being added to this group at a rate 
of two or three per week. Currently, twenty-three percent of organizations with over 
5000 employees provide health benefits to domestic partners. Additionally, thirteen 
percent of employers with 1000 to 4999 employees and twelve percent of employers 
with 200 to 999 employees provide domestic partner health benefits. 
Cox, supra note 6, at 82 (citations omitted). With respect to domestic partnership benefits 
adopted by private entities, see generally, Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and Same-
Sex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998). 
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III. THREE APPROACHES TO DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP SCHEMES 
A. The Leveling Position 
Let us begin by examining the Leveling Position, which treats 
same-sex couples more favorably than opposite-sex couples in do-
mestic partnership schemes by granting such benefits only to the 
former. The major justification relied upon by “Levelers” for this 
disparate treatment is that opposite-sex, unmarried couples have the 
legal right to marry, while same-sex couples do not. Offering same-
sex couples domestic partnership benefits enables them to approxi-
mate those benefits they would have were they given the right to 
marry—a “leveling of the playing field” approach.15 
But some Levelers look beyond this difference in marriage rights 
offered to these two groups by also examining the motivations of 
opposite-sex, unmarried couples in making their decision not to 
marry. For example, James Donovan condemns the decision of such 
opposite-sex couples not to marry: 
 Unmarried heterosexual couples claiming status as domestic 
partners seek the economic benefits of marriage without the social 
responsibilities. Achieving this end would require that marriage ob-
ligations become independent of marriage rewards, whereas pres-
ently marriage implies that duties entail rewards. . . .  
 . . . [I]t is a lowering of that institution [marriage] in status and 
prestige. As such, heterosexual domestic partnerships transgress the 
higher principle of preserving marriage in its present status, and on 
this basis their encouragement should be judged antisocial. Those 
who desire the benefits of marriage, and are able to marry, should 
get married.16 
For Levelers, opposite-sex, unmarried couples employ domestic 
partnership schemes to gain the benefits of marriage while avoiding 
its obligations, and, in doing so, they denigrate the institution of 
marriage. In contrast, for same-sex couples, domestic partnership 
schemes are but a temporary remedy for the failure of the larger soci-
 
 15. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 1, at 657 (“Same-sex-only domestic partnerships are 
an effort to balance the scales in the arena of domestic relations. To include heterosexuals 
would preserve their significant advantage by giving them two options where [gays] would 
have only the one.”). 
 16. Id. at 657. 
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ety to extend full marriage rights to them. 
Let us examine the Leveling Position along the parameters sug-
gested above: goals of family law, fairness and equality, and gay 
rights. What proves interesting about this position is that its advo-
cates (who strongly support gay rights) are, at best, lukewarm sup-
porters of domestic partnerships schemes. Marriage is the desired re-
lationship; domestic partnerships are a temporary remedy and one 
that should be open only to those who are unfairly excluded from 
the opportunity to marry. As Donovan explains, “[H]eterosexual 
domestic partnerships threaten to undermine the status of  
marriage . . . .”17 He continues, “[w]hen marriage becomes an op-
tion for same-sex couples, then domestic partner benefits for same-
sex couples should immediately terminate.”18 
Thus, in terms of the family law goal of fostering long-term, sta-
ble relationships, Levelers believe that the domestic partnership al-
ternative is clearly inferior to marriage. Their arguments for support-
ing domestic partnership schemes at all evolve from a commitment 
to values of fairness and equality. 
Despite this seeming commitment to fairness and equality, how-
ever, the Leveling Position has inherent within it a form of discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation—albeit a discrimination that fa-
vors gay and lesbian people. This aspect of the Leveling Position has 
not gone unnoticed. In Foray v. Bell Atlantic,19 the plaintiff alleged 
that an employee benefits plan adopted by NYNEX that extended a 
range of benefits to same-sex domestic partners, but not to opposite-
sex partners, violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.20 He asserted that, but for the fact that he is male and 
his domestic partner is female, he met all of the criteria for receiving 
benefits under the NYNEX plan. He asserted, “[A]ll things being 
equal, if Foray’s gender were female, he would be entitled to claim 
his domestic partner as an eligible dependent under the benefits 
plan.”21 The court in effect adopted the Leveling Position’s rationale 
in rejecting Foray’s arguments: 
 
 
 17. Id. at 665. 
 18. Id. at 667. 
 19. 56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 20. See id. at 328–29. 
 21. Id. 
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Plaintiff’s claim that he was treated different from similarly situated 
persons of the opposite sex depends on the assumption that a simi-
larly situated woman is one who has a female domestic partner. 
However, a woman with a female domestic partner is differently 
situated from plaintiff in material respects because under current 
law, she, unlike plaintiff, is unable to marry her partner. A woman 
and her same-sex domestic partner, unlike plaintiff and Ms. 
Muntzner, will never be eligible for a host of benefits available to 
opposite-sex couples who are able to marry.22 
A similar claim was raised in Cleaves v. City of Chicago.23 In that 
case, an employee was fired for, among other reasons, calling in sick 
on the death of his fiancé’s father, claiming that his “father-in-law” 
had died. He alleged illegal sex discrimination under Title VII be-
cause had he been “an unmarried woman, rather than an unmarried 
man, the City would have granted him paid leave due to the death of 
the father of his female domestic partner” under the City’s Domestic 
Partner Benefits Eligibility Ordinance.24 In rejecting this argument, 
the court concluded that the only discrimination involved was based 
on marital status, which was not protected by Title VII: 
[T]he Ordinance does not involve treating men less favorably than 
women on the basis of marital status, but only treating unmarried 
same-sex couples differently from unmarried opposite-sex couples. 
It treats men and women exactly the same: if Mr. Cleaves’ non-
marital partner were male and they otherwise met the criteria for 
domestic partnership, he would have been eligible for any benefits 
available to same-sex female couples . . . . The Ordinance is there-
fore legal discrimination on the basis of marital status, not sex dis-
crimination involving discrimination against men (or women) be-
cause of marital status.25 
In effect, the court also adopted the Leveling Position, focusing 
on the fact that same-sex couples have no opportunity to marry. It is 
worth noting that the plaintiff in Cleaves did not assert that he was 
discriminated against based on his heterosexual orientation.26 Courts 
have long held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
is not protected under Title VII, and this conclusion was recently re-
 
 22. Id. at 330 (citations omitted). 
 23. 68 F. Supp. 2d 963 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 24. Id. at 966. 
 25. Id. at 967. 
 26. See id. at 966 n.2. 
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inforced by a decision of the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.27 
Nonetheless, assuming Levelers are committed to principles of 
gender equality and fairness—principles that view discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity to be as egregious as 
discrimination based on a person’s sex—they should be extremely 
wary of endorsing any governmental program, however favorable to 
same-sex couples, that relies on sexual orientation discrimination. 
Gay people have too often been the brunt of such discrimination, 
and we should be the last to rely on a person’s sexual orientation as a 
basis for denying him or her governmental benefits. 
How does the Leveling position fare from the viewpoint of ad-
vancing the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people? While the 
Leveling Position may at first blush seem attractive to gay rights ad-
vocates, this approach toward domestic partnership benefits in the 
public sphere has a tendency to cordon off and stigmatize gay and 
lesbian couples into a second-class status. Creating a domestic part-
nership status reserved solely to same-sex couples sends the unfortu-
nate message that such relationships are fundamentally different from 
and inferior to relationships between opposite-sex couples. Limiting 
domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples has the effect of 
creating a “separate and unequal” status that may well impede the 
long-term struggle for full marriage rights.28 Having “thrown the 
bone” of domestic partnerships to gays and lesbians, a sense may de-
velop that the electorate need go no further. 
B. The Equality Position 
Second, let us examine the Equality Position, which treats same-
sex and opposite-sex, unmarried couples identically—the approach 
taken by chapter 6 of the ALI Principles.29 This position is most de-
fensible in terms of the underlying goals of family law, in terms of 
fundamental values of equality and fairness, and, finally, in terms of 
the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people. 
 
 27. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that a claim alleging discrimination based solely on sexual orientation does not state a cause of 
action for sex discrimination under Title VII). 
 28. See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions 
Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 123 (2000). 
 29. See also Habegger, supra note 2, at 1010–13. 
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The justification for this approach is two-fold. The Equality Posi-
tion sees no moral difference between same-sex and opposite-sex, 
unmarried couples in terms of the worthiness of their relationships. 
Any relationship between two unrelated, loving adults is as worthy as 
any other such relationship, irrespective of the sex of the partners. 
Accordingly, to the extent that a state-sponsored domestic benefits 
program is made available to support relationships between unmar-
ried couples, it should be made available to all such relationships.30 
Moreover, the Equality Position considers an opposite-sex, un-
married couple’s choice to share their lives together in a cohabitation 
relationship as an acceptable alternative to marriage worthy of state 
recognition (whether or not marriage is to be preferred). In other 
words, the equality position is willing to recognize that there is value 
in relationships other than marriage. In part, this justification is 
based on the notion that couples should have the freedom to deter-
mine how best to structure their own relationships, including the 
freedom to determine whether or not to marry. 
With respect to same-sex couples, the Equality Position recog-
nizes the fact that although many same-sex couples would marry if 
given the opportunity to do so, not all would. Some loving, commit-
ted, long-term same-sex couples consciously reject the institution of 
marriage for many of the same reasons that some opposite-sex cou-
ples decide not to marry.31 Some commentators in fact view domes-
tic partnership status as preferable to marriage. Charles Pouncey 
notes: 
Rather than descending from a tradition in which marriage repre-
sented the sale or acquisition of a woman by a man and his family, 
domestic partnership arises from the traditions of business partner-
 
 30. See Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Redefining Family in the 
Work Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 49 (1994) (“The philosophy behind domestic part-
nership coverage is that an employee and his or her partner are, in effect, spouses. Benefits are 
made available to an employee and his or her partner just as they are available to an employee 
and his or her spouse. The goals of domestic partnership coverage are those of fairness, non-
discrimination, and equality among all employees, regardless of marital status.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Charles R. P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and 
Inequality, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 363, 376 (1998) (“Lesbian and gay domestic 
partnership as an institution, however, presents opportunities for its growth and development 
in response to its interactions with queer cultures, which will not be available in same-sex mar-
riage.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian 
Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1535 (1993). 
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ships. Traditional business partnerships, unlike marriage, are envi-
sioned as relationships in which the partners are equal and owe 
each other the utmost duties of care and loyalty. Therefore, domes-
tic partnership has no necessary relationship to patriarchy or hetero-
sexism.32 
The Equality Position is further based on the reality that fewer 
and fewer individuals live in a traditional family setting of a husband, 
a wife, and their own children.33 Despite this fact, many nontradi-
tional families are able to serve well the emotional, social, and finan-
cial needs of the couple and their children.34 Accordingly, the State 
should be willing to support the needs of all nontraditional families 
through alternative domestic partnership schemes, irrespective of the 
genders of the partners at the head of such households. 
This important characteristic of the Equality Position is worth 
emphasizing. While not asserting that domestic partnership relation-
ships are necessarily better than or even equivalent to the marriage 
relationship, underlying the Equality Position is a belief that it is 
wrong for the State in general to dictate how couples should struc-
ture their private relationships.35 Though the State may show its 
preference for marriage by offering more benefits to couples who 
marry, the Equality Position believes that those who choose to struc-
ture their relationships in a way other than marriage are still entitled 
to have those relationships supported with respect to certain essen-
tials: hospital visitation, health care benefits, and inheritance rights, 
among others. The ALI Principles extend state support for nontradi-
tional couples to the dissolution of the relationship by requiring that 
there be an equitable distribution of assets acquired during the part-
nership.36 
 
 32. Pouncy, supra note 31, at 376. 
 33. See Habegger, supra note 2, at 1010 (suggesting that only twenty-five percent of 
this nation’s households fit this traditional pattern). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Cf. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman, 
Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 13 (2000). In her work, Fineman argues for the abolition of tra-
ditional marriage, suggesting that the state should not be supporting or fostering voluntary 
adult sexual relationships through the institution of marriage, but rather should direct its laws 
toward fostering relationships of need such as that between a parent and child, or an adult and 
an aging parent. 
 36. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, ch. 6 (relating to 
“Domestic Partners”). 
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Assessing the Equality Position in terms of the family law goal of 
fostering stable, long-term relationships is complicated. In contrast 
to the Levelers, who admit up front that domestic partnership status 
is flawed and at most a temporary solution, the Equality Position 
views domestic partnerships as a viable, valid alternative to marriage. 
To judge the success of this position along the lines of family law 
values, one must separate same-sex from opposite-sex, unmarried 
couples. 
With respect to same-sex couples, the picture is relatively clear. 
Given that there currently exists no opportunity to marry, a same-sex 
couple seeking to formalize and gain recognition of their relationship 
may have but one choice—to take advantage of a domestic partner-
ship scheme. As a general matter, the effect of engaging in the sym-
bolic act of gaining state recognition of their relationship is likely to 
encourage a same-sex couple, their families, and their friends to take 
that relationship seriously and would thereby result in a more stable, 
longer-term commitment to one another. Though focusing on the 
State’s recognizing same-sex marriage, Jennifer Wiggins’s discussion 
of the expressive function of family law is equally applicable to the 
State’s recognizing domestic partnerships: 
The “story told by law” about lesbian and gay coupled, committed 
relationships by the exclusion from marriage is that they do not ex-
ist or do not count. Law tells all people that lesbians and gay men 
are lone individuals despite the fact that they have “familistic” rela-
tionships. This story is both false and stigmatizing. . . .  
 . . . . 
 “Familistic” relationships and relationships of mutual depend-
ence and support between coupled adults are good for society, as 
well as the members of the relationship, and should be recognized 
and supported by law.37 
With respect to opposite-sex couples, the picture is blurrier. As 
Margaret Brinig notes, “Cohabiting partners . . . ha[ve] less com-
mitment to each other than do married spouses and are more likely 
to think in terms of short-term rather than long-term conse-
quences.”38 Accepting domestic partnership status as a permanent, 
 
 37. Wriggins, supra note 13, at 293, 298. 
 38. Margaret Brinig, Domestic Partnership: Missing the Mark, unpublished manuscript 
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alternative to marriage may not foster the longevity of some relation-
ships. Nonetheless, longevity of a relationship is but one value fos-
tered by family law. Allowing two individuals the autonomy and 
freedom to structure their relationship in a way that suits them is also 
an important family law value and one which may trump longevity 
for some couples.39 Moreover, as noted above, some couples choose 
not to enter into the institution of marriage because of its historical 
association with sexism and hierarchy in our society.40 The argument 
is made that longevity is only worth striving for in a relationship of 
equals and that the formal institution of marriage is not conducive to 
such a relationship.41 
Domestic partnership schemes inevitably are less attractive than 
marriage in terms of state-derived benefits. This alone should keep 
the domestic partnership alternative from siphoning off large num-
bers of couples from marriage. Moreover, as Mark Strasser argues,42 
domestic partnership laws, such as that embodied in the proposed 
Principles chapter 6 (“Principles on Domestic Partners”), tend to 
equalize the obligations associated with domestic partnerships in 
comparison to those associated with marriage. To the extent that a 
couple cannot avoid marital obligations through the domestic part-
nership alternative, more couples will be likely to choose to marry. In 
this sense, if more opposite-sex couples who first enter into domestic 
partnerships later choose to marry, then state-sponsored domestic 
partnership schemes may in fact lead to long-term, stable, committed 
relationships. 
The Equality Position’s major appeal is its commitment to the 
values of fairness and equality. Its refusal to view any long-term cou-
ple, regardless of gender or sexual orientation, as less worthy of gov-
 
presented at Brigham Young University symposium on family law (2001). 
 39. Carl Schneider and Margaret Brinig note:  
One of the most potent ideas in American law is the belief in the centrality of indi-
vidual autonomy. Autonomy is not just institutionalized as a value of American law; 
it is cherished as the heart of American life. Americans of all stripes believe that at 
least some aspects of “private life” are not the law’s business, even though they dis-
agree about just what aspects those are. It is thus no surprise that questions about 
the scope of individual autonomy pervade and perplex family law.  
SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 4, at 165. 
 40. See Pouncy, supra note 31. 
 41. See sources cited supra note 31. 
 42. Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommenda-
tion, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1135. 
7KOG.DOC 1/9/02  10:19 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1036 
ernment benefits makes this position particularly appealing in a soci-
ety that highly values equality. By rejecting hierarchies among loving 
couples with respect to their worthiness for state recognition, the 
Equality Position fosters fundamental values of equality and fairness. 
Moreover, the Equality Position is immune from attack in those 
states that have laws prohibiting discrimination based upon, among 
other factors, sexual orientation and/or marital status.43 
Finally, the Equality Position is supportive of the goal of further-
ing the rights of gay and lesbian people.44 By not cordoning off 
same-sex couples into a unique status maintained solely for gay and 
lesbian people, the Equality Position emphasizes the commonality 
that same-sex couples have with all loving couples. Moreover, any 
political attempt to repeal state-sponsored domestic partnership 
status for opposite-sex couples (perhaps out of concern that it un-
dermines marriage) will be forced to confront the fact that same-sex 
couples are also covered by the domestic partnership scheme. Of 
course legislators could choose to maintain such a scheme only for 
same-sex couples. However, any debate on the weaknesses of domes-
tic partnerships will inevitably force a legislature to confront directly 
arguments as to the inherent unfairness of not extending full mar-
riage rights to gay and lesbian people. 
C. The Moralistic Position 
Finally, let us examine the Moralistic Position, which I believe to 
be the least defensible of the three positions and one that runs 
counter to basic goals of family law. The Moralistic Position begins 
from the premise that, to protect the institution of marriage, the 
State must refuse to recognize any alternative relationships, including 
domestic partnerships. To give such recognition would, in effect, 
give the State’s imprimatur to such relationships, and thereby make 
marriage less attractive. This position is represented by a number of 
commentators. Typical is Lynne Marie Kohm’s suggestion: “[U]nder 
chapter 6 of these proposals, marriage per se is no longer necessary 
for intimacy and companionship to be afforded many financial and 
 
 43. See Habeggar, supra note 2, at 1007. 
 44. The major gay rights organizations—the Human Rights Campaign, the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund—all either sup-
port or are not opposed to including unmarried opposite-sex couples within domestic partner-
ship schemes. See Donovan, supra note 1, at 665–66. 
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legal benefits. Marriage will be downgraded, and pragmatically easier 
to abandon.”45 She goes on to assert that “[d]iluted by options like 
domestic partnership, the institution of marriage will suffer from be-
ing watered down, weakened, even insipid.”46 The Moralistic Posi-
tion’s view that domestic partnership schemes might undermine the 
institution of marriage is surely not irrational, though it does rely on 
complex empirical assumptions that few seem concerned about veri-
fying through social science research.47 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that allowing a prolif-
eration of state-recognized, alternative relationships might in the 
long run undermine marriage. As suggested throughout this paper, a 
central function of family law is its channeling function—using law 
to encourage couples to marry in order to foster long-term, stable, 
mutually supportive relationships between two people, relationships 
that provide an emotionally healthy and economically-viable setting 
in which to rear children. Surely, this is a function of family law that 
Moralists would endorse, and, arguably, this function is not fostered 
by domestic partnership schemes. 
But if Moralists truly seek to channel couples into long-term sta-
ble relationships (and on that basis refuse to recognize domestic 
partnerships schemes), there is no reason not to extend marriage 
rights to all couples who seek to spend their lives in long-term, sta-
ble, committed relationships and possibly raise children together—
same-sex couples as well as opposite-sex couples. Why would a posi-
tion that values marriage so highly not seek to open that institution 
to all couples willing to accept the rights and obligations inherent in 
marriage? 
The reason is clear. Marriage is not the only value important to 
the Moralistic Position. It is emblematic of the Moralistic Position 
that it rejects any state recognition of same-sex relationships. In fact, 
based on this antihomosexual commitment,48 the Moralistic Position 
 
 45. See Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic 
Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. (forthcoming no. 1, 2001). 
 46. See id. 
 47. Margaret Brinig’s paper presented at this conference is one of the few attempts to 
actually employ social science research to support the view that domestic partnership schemes 
have a tendency to undermine marriage between opposite-sex couples. See Brinig, supra note 
38. Brinig’s paper, which addresses only opposite-sex couples, is silent on same-sex relation-
ships. Accordingly, her position does not fall within the Moralistic Position as defined in this 
article. 
 48. In my view, the body of scholarship by commentators such as Lynn Wardle warrants 
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not only refuses to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. It 
goes further and opposes granting second-class, domestic partnership 
status to such couples. It is my contention that this antihomosexual 
value ends up consuming any consistent commitment that the Mor-
alistic Position may have to the family law goals that underlie the in-
stitution of marriage. 
How does the Moralistic Position attempt to reconcile its pro-
marriage value and its antihomosexual value? It does this through 
two strategies. The first is to appeal to history and definition. The 
second, more insidious strategy is to resort to overstatement and dis-
tortion. Let us examine these two strategies by focusing on the work 
of Lynn Wardle. 
First, let us examine his appeal to history and definition. Wardle 
states: 
 There is no doubt that historically marriage has always referred 
to the union of a man and a woman in a unique relationship of 
commitment and intimacy, and that marriage today is overwhelm-
ingly defined as a heterosexual union. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he union of a man and a woman is part of the very na-
ture and reality of the marriage relationship itself. The covenant un-
ion between a man and woman that we call marriage is unique.49 
History is a frightening touchstone on which to rely for the ulti-
mate, unchanging meaning of marriage. Historically, marriage has 
meant an institution in which women were subjugated to men; his-
torically, under miscegenation laws, marriage has meant an institu-
tion in which interracial couples were not allowed to have their lov-
ing relationships legally recognized.50 Thankfully, the historical 
“meaning” of marriage has not stopped enlightened courts and legis-
 
the description “antihomosexual.” See, e.g., Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3; Lynn 
D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. 
REV. 1 (1996); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 
1790–1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosex-
ual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997). 
 49. See Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 748–49. See also David O. Coo-
lidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25 
VT. L. REV. 61, 66–67 (2000). 
 50. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state miscegenation laws 
as unconstitutional). 
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latures from tossing those aspects of the “definition” of marriage 
onto the waste pile of other social prejudices that society has re-
jected.51 
Because history and definition alone cannot do the trick, the sec-
ond and more insidious strategy employed by the Moralistic Position 
to justify denying marriage rights to same-sex couples is a strategy of 
overstatement and distortion. To begin with, the Moralistic Position 
grossly overstates the benefits that have come to society from the fact 
that traditional marriage has been between a male and a female, and 
asserts that these supposed benefits could never be achieved by same-
sex coupling. Again, Wardle’s writings supply numerous examples: 
The nature of the relationship between two persons of the same sex 
is fundamentally different than the heterosexual relationship that is 
marriage. . . . [N]o other companionate relationship provides the 
same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the 
heterosexual covenant union we call marriage, and that is why only 
committed heterosexual unions are given the legal status of mar-
riage. . . .  
 . . . . 
 . . . The legal status of marriage has been reserved exclusively for 
special covenant heterosexual unions because those unions are 
unique and uniquely beneficial. The right to enter that unique rela-
tionship is now generally recognized to be one of the basic human 
rights because that relationship is unique and uniquely important 
to humanity.52 
Though Wardle is effusive in his use of the word “unique” to de-
scribe opposite-sex marriage,53 his work is devoid of social science 
data to support these overstated claims. Moreover, also absent from 
his work is any support for the proposition that committed same-sex 
 
 51. With respect to marriage rights, other countries have moved more quickly than has 
the United States in casting aside anti-homosexual prejudices concerning same-sex marriage. 
On April 1, 2001, the Netherlands extended full marriage rights to same-sex couples. See 
Dutch Gay Couples Prepare to Wed: First Legal Marriages to Take Place Sunday, DENV. 
POST,  Mar. 1, 2001, at A21, available at 2001 WL 6748047. 
 52. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 749–50. 
 53. It is surely a misdescription to use the term “heterosexual” to describe traditional 
marriage. The examples are rampant of gay individuals who bowed to social pressure by marry-
ing someone of the opposite sex, only to cause extreme unhappiness both to their spouses and 
to themselves. 
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couples could not also gain the identical benefits from marriage that 
opposite-sex couples gain and, in turn, benefit the broader society 
through their legal union. 
Apart from not supporting his exaggerated claims, Wardle’s de-
scription of opposite-sex marriage simply does not match the reality 
of modern society. Given current divorce rates and the rise in domes-
tic violence, empirical data cannot possibly support the glorification 
attributed by the Moralistic Position to the gendered nature of tradi-
tional marriage. Andrew Sullivan points out: 
[T]oday’s marriage law is utterly uninterested in character. There 
are no legal requirements that a married couple learn from each 
other, grow together spiritually, or even live together. A random 
woman can marry a multimillionaire of a Fox TV special and the 
law will accord that marriage no less validity than a lifelong com-
mitment between Billy Graham and his wife. The courts have up-
held an absolutely unrestricted right to marry for deadbeat dads, 
men with countless divorces behind them, prisoners on death row, 
even the insane.”54 
At the same time, the Moralistic Position distorts the truth about 
gay and lesbian people by demonizing and dehumanizing virtually 
every aspect of their lives. Gays and lesbians are portrayed as danger-
ous, unstable, promiscuous, disease-spreading socio-paths, unable to 
sustain lasting meaningful relationships and therefore unworthy of 
marriage rights. A clear example is, again, set forth in the work of 
Lynn Wardle. In an effort to portray gay and lesbian people as psy-
chologically flawed, Wardle attributes a root cause of homosexuality 
in modern society to the rise in divorce rates and general decline in 
our society’s respect for marriage. In an attempt at armchair psy-
chology, he states: 
 Many of those children of the first generation of liberal (no-
fault) divorce and socially accepted childbearing out of wedlock are 
now of marriage age. Some may be drawn to homosexual relation-
ships as a result of the childhood pains or fears associated with 
marital failure or other family dysfunctioning. . . .  
 
 54. Andrew Sullivan, Marriage or Bust—Why Civil Unions Aren’t Enough (2001) avail-
able at http://www.andrewsullivan.com/text/hits_article.html?5,homosexuality; see also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 62–66 (1996) (suggesting 
that, in granting marriage licenses, states have never imposed requirements that the applicants 
be good people or prove that they will be good spouses). 
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 Likewise, marital breakup sours some divorced men and women 
on marriage. Among the ranks of lesbian and gay couples are many 
divorced persons. They, too, may have turned to homosexual rela-
tionships after the painful experience of their own marital failure.55 
Wardle is oblivious to the fact that gay people appear across so-
cieties and throughout history,56 and his attempt to tie homosexual-
ity to the decline of the modern family is less than compelling. 
In addition, the Moralistic Position turns a blind eye to the fact 
that millions of children are currently being reared in families by 
same-sex couples, children who have the same need for the state to 
recognize and support their parents’ relationships as do children be-
ing reared by opposite-sex couples.57 Though the Moralistic Position 
grandstands the importance of marriage, its antihomosexual agenda 
keeps it from acknowledging that extending its bounds to all couples 
who seek to fulfill its underlying purposes would only strengthen the 
institution of marriage. Though the rhetoric of family values runs 
throughout the Moralistic Position, it is one of the least family-
oriented movements in the history of family law. 
So how does the Moralistic Position fare along the three parame-
ters we have been examining? In terms of the channeling function of 
family law aimed at fostering long-term, stable relationships, the 
Moralistic Position is an abysmal failure. Its antihomosexual com-
mitment blinds it to the fact that extending marriage rights to gay 
people would only enhance the possibility that same-sex couples 
would remain committed to one another for much longer periods of 
time than has been the norm in the gay community.58 Moreover, the 
idea that somehow extending marital rights to same-sex couples will 
result in fewer opposite-sex couples choosing to marry is groundless. 
 
 55. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 4, at 764. 
 56. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: 
GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE 
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 41–59 (1980) (arguing that gay people have existed throughout his-
tory). 
 57. “Approximately three million gay men and lesbians in the United States are parents, 
and between eight and ten million children are raised in gay or lesbian households.” Develop-
ments—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1629 (1989) (citing ABA 
Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513 
(Aug. 25, 1987)). 
 58. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 54, at 71 (“Getting married signals a significantly 
higher level of commitment, in part because the law imposes much greater obligations on the 
couple and makes it much more of a bother and expense to break up. . . . Moreover, the duties 
and obligations of marriage directly contribute to interpersonal commitment.”). 
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With respect to the values of fairness and equality, the Moralistic 
Position posits differences between same-sex and opposite-sex un-
married couples and then urges that these differences are grounds for 
not allowing same-sex couples to marry. For example, Wardle sug-
gests that same-sex relationships are inherently nonmonogamous: 
“Obviously, sexual relations between persons of the same gender are 
different from sexual relations between male-female couples. But that 
is not the only difference. For instance, sexual fidelity is not an ex-
pected or typical characteristic in same-sex relationships, especially 
among gay men.”59 
He uses this as an argument for not extending marriage rights to 
gay men. (It’s less than clear how Wardle moves from this argument 
to an argument that lesbians also should not be allowed to marry.) 
Having pointed out that no state investigates an individual’s charac-
ter or suitability for marriage before issuing a marriage license, An-
drew Sullivan offers a telling response to Wardle: 
Even if you concede that gay men—being men—are, in the aggre-
gate, less likely to live up to the standards of monogamy and com-
mitment that marriage demands, this still suggests a further ques-
tion: Are they less likely than, say, an insane person? A straight man 
with multiple divorces behind him? A murderer on death row? A 
president of the United States? The truth is, these judgments sim-
ply cannot be fairly made against a whole group of people. We do 
not look at, say the higher divorce and illegitimacy rates among Af-
rican Americans and conclude that they should have the right to 
marry taken away from them. In fact, we conclude the opposite: 
It’s precisely because of the high divorce and illegitimacy rates that 
the institution of marriage is so critical for black America. So why is 
that argument not applied to homosexuals?60 
Even if an identifiable group of people in our society were shown 
to have higher divorce or illegitimacy rate, nonetheless we would 
consider it a horrendous violation of human rights to prohibit such 
persons from marrying, believing that all should have the opportu-
nity to take advantage of this fundamental human right.61 The argu-
 
 59. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 759. 
 60. See Sullivan, supra note 54. 
 61. The Supreme Court has noted: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Mar-
riage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.” 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966). 
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ment that loving gay couples should not be allowed to marry be-
cause they are more likely to be promiscuous is one we would never 
allow for opposite-sex couples, irrespective of what statistics might 
show. The antihomosexual value of the Moralistic Position leads it to 
take what can only be described as immoral, inhuman positions when 
it comes to the rights of gay people to pursue happiness and fulfill-
ment in their lives, pursuits fundamental to our society. 
Finally, with respect to the consideration of gay rights, little need 
be said. It is the homophobic rhetoric of the Moralistic Position that 
has led so many people in our country to ignore the truth of the lives 
of gay and lesbian people.62 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the end, perhaps the Moralistic Position is right: domestic 
partnership arrangements may detract from the emphasis that our 
society has traditionally given to marriage relationships. As Bruce 
Hafen notes, “[L]egal marriage is more likely than is unmarried co-
habitation to encourage . . . personal willingness to labor and ‘invest’ 
in relationships with other people, whether child or adult.”63 
Unfortunately, our society has not yet met the challenge of treat-
ing all loving couples in a fair and equal manner. Currently, same-sex 
couples have only the domestic partnership option available to them. 
In this second-best world, it is important that the ultimate values 
that motivate gay advocates to pursue extending the right to marry 
to same-sex couples—fair and equal treatment before the law—also 
guide decision-making along the road to that goal. So long as do-
mestic partnership schemes are the only alternative available to same-
sex couples, fairness dictates that these rights be extended equally to 
opposite-sex, unmarried couples. The Equality Position is, accord-
ingly, the preferred approach for those drafting and enacting domes-
tic partnership statutes and ordinances. 
 
 62. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Dis-
course and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (pre-
senting a history of the rhetoric of antigay discourse). 
 63. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy: 
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 490 (1983). 
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